1) OSU
2) Duke
2) Kansas
4) Texas
5) Pitt
6) BYU
A bit of separation at the top finally, but not much.
7) Purdue
8) San Diego St
8) Wisconsin
10) Kentucky
11) Washington
12) Georgetown
13) North Carolina
14) Villanova
15) Arizona
16) Syracuse
17) Notre Dame
18) Illinois
19) Louisville
20) Connecticut
21) Vanderbilt
22) St Marys
22) West Virginia
22) George Mason
25) Missouri
26) Belmont (still being very sneaky)
27) Maryland, also being very sneaky. By losing many games.
Overall, it looks like the SEC is very overrated by the RPI (other than Kentucky, which is underrated), along with Conference USA. The ACC (with the exception of Boston College), and to some extent the Big Ten is underrated. Pac 10 is always underrated by this stupid ratings system.
Teams that are overrated by the ESPN-RPI crowd: Boston College, Georgia, Memphis, Baylor, Tennessee, Texas AM, Princeton, Colorado St
Teams that are on the bracket now: Michigan St, Xavier, Gonzaga.
Teams that dropped out of contention: Northwestern, Boston College.
Bubble looks something like this:
Xavier, Michigan St, UCLA, Gonzaga, New Mexico, Washington St, Butler/Cleveland St IN. ODU, Alabama, Richmond, Michigan, Baylor, Nebraska, Colorado, Georgia, UAB/UTEP OUT. Northwestern, Boston College, Colorado St, Missouri St, Southern Miss, Memphis way out. The bubble as a whole looks pretty soft. I really wish they hadn't expanded the field. At least 10 teams at this rate are going to get at-large bids that are middling at best.
A lot of conference USA types are decent teams, should get a decent seeding if they get in by winning the conference, but are mediocre enough that they should escape notice if they don't get a bid. The only mid-majors or minor conferences teams that should get in regardless are St Marys, George Mason, Utah St, Wichita St and Belmont, with Temple and Xavier from the A10. Duquesne is a lock on my list, but not on anyone else's (usually Richmond instead). Wichita St hasn't actually beaten anyone however, same with Belmont (two close losses to Tennessee on the road) so they're both at risk. The Mountain West is much better than the SEC and pretty close to the Pac 10 on my list and it is not a "mid major" conference if there are 5 teams in the discussion, and 3 of them as locks, and two of those up for favorable home court first round games. That looks a lot more like say the Big 12 than the Missouri Valley or even the Atlantic 10.
16 February 2011
15 February 2011
So much for that "we're not social conservatives"
from these tea partiers who are supposedly concerned about fiscal matters.
Bullshit. Says I.
South Dakota
And Ohio say otherwise.
The South Dakota "defence" offered in Washington Post is particularly curious.
""Say an ex-boyfriend who happens to be father of a baby doesn't want to pay child support for the next 18 years, and he beats on his ex-girfriend's abdomen in trying to abort her baby. If she did kill him, it would be justified. She is resisting an effort to murder her unborn child." --- only there are already laws against such things. Such as assault. And South Dakota and some other states allow additional murder or manslaughter charges in cases where a pregnant woman is killed or assaulted. What isn't clear here is how someone who isn't involved in the actual decision to conduct and have an abortion, say, this mythical boyfriend, who decides they need to kill someone like the doctor conducting the abortion in order to prevent it, is now somehow magically not encouraged to do so by a law which specifically states "unborn" as a protected class.
Bullshit. Says I.
South Dakota
And Ohio say otherwise.
The South Dakota "defence" offered in Washington Post is particularly curious.
""Say an ex-boyfriend who happens to be father of a baby doesn't want to pay child support for the next 18 years, and he beats on his ex-girfriend's abdomen in trying to abort her baby. If she did kill him, it would be justified. She is resisting an effort to murder her unborn child." --- only there are already laws against such things. Such as assault. And South Dakota and some other states allow additional murder or manslaughter charges in cases where a pregnant woman is killed or assaulted. What isn't clear here is how someone who isn't involved in the actual decision to conduct and have an abortion, say, this mythical boyfriend, who decides they need to kill someone like the doctor conducting the abortion in order to prevent it, is now somehow magically not encouraged to do so by a law which specifically states "unborn" as a protected class.
Budget cuts
Cabinet departments.
End agricultural subsidies (this is about 30 billion)
End trade barriers on agriculture (sugar and milk are the most well-known of these).
Basically just abolish the department of agriculture and leave the USDA's food safety system in place (and consolidate the USDA and FDA mandates and departments into one branch rather than spread all over like some grotesque word salad of rules)
Abolish the vice presidency and any duplicate functions of the executive branch associated with the bureaucracy for this position. I've already outlined my presumed method of replacement should the president be assassinated, killed, or die in office. Some method of chain of command would already be in place should the President be seriously ill for a period of time (say a stroke, cancer, etc).
Abolish department of Homeland Security. These functions were all properly maintained in pre-existing federal bureaucracies (FBI, CIA, NSA, etc). Privatize airport security as well.
Abolish DEA and DARE program and related drug enforcement positions.
Abolish or privatize the postal service.
Abolish department of Commerce, or at least its non-statistical/patent law functions (essentially all commercial subsidies). I guess we can keep the census, NOAA, BEA, NIST and patent office. ITA needs to go.
Abolish the department of Energy. Most of this money is subsidies on coal, oil, and maintenance of DoD nuclear activities (which can be done by the DoD). (about 40 billion total).
Abolish the department of Transportation. Retain or phase out gasoline taxes, but ideally implement more local/state toll taxes on congestion pricing for controlled access roads (ie, highways) instead. Privatizing air traffic control should have been done decades ago. (about 80 billion)
Curtail the department of labour's activities to those related to fair labour practices and the collection of labour statistics (such as employment). Why we need a faith-based and community initiative board funded at the federal level is beyond me already, but why it's seated in the DoL is even stranger.
Abolish HUD. Maintain some basic banking regulations on loans and mortgages and for home construction instead. Local-state governments should abolish rent controls while we're at it. If nothing else, kick out Fannie and Freddie immediately.
Abolish department of Education. Reform payment of schools to create a system of tax credits issued for education spending, payable to any institution of the taxpayers' choice. A similar concept for health insurance and retirement spending may be reasonable, though in all three cases, the government should not control where the money must go (other than that it should be spent on some enterprise related to the tax credit, education spending for the education tax credits, health spending for the health credit), and we should have something like actual health insurance as an option (that is: catastrophic health care coverage with a high deductible, possibly with guaranteed issue, but risk-adjusted premiums, just like any other form of insurance). May end up costing about the same in actual subsidies, but often at the state-local level instead of federal.
Presumably smaller cuts are there to be made to state and treasury, or at least reforms, though neither takes up a substantial part of the budget on its own.
Defence spending
Reduce our nuclear arsenal
Major cuts to defence spending and reform procurement and payment for military. I would suggest about half of the defence budget over a 10 year period be trimmed off. This would still put us at about 3 times the next highest country and the level of the entire EU. Much of current military bloating spending is related to the idea that more ground troops would be needed to fight wars and create occupations like those Iraq or Afghanistan. Such wars are a considerable waste of time and money and do not serve to increase national security. Therefore, the type of thinking necessary to fight such wars is flawed. At best we should retain a high-quality special operations force for such incursions, and move on to other national defence priorities than fighting peasants over rocks. Large portions of spending are also allocated to construction projects in these war-zones. While I do not object to foreign aid as such, I don't see its utility in an active war zone of an occupied country.
Devolve the VA into DoD funding. We don't need an additional special interest group with a seat at the table for veterans over and above active soldiers.
Entitlements.
Block grants for medicaid instead of matching grants.
Voucherized/means test Social security/medicare. Phased in so near-retirees don't freak out.
Alternatively, use a negative income tax and abolish (nearly) all forms of welfare and itemized deductions. This would end things like the home mortgage interest deduction, food stamps, unemployment insurance, social security, medicare, and so on. A downside risk is a few extra lazy people who don't produce anything for the economy. But personally, I'd rather such people not be working. They're not likely to be very productive employees anyway.
End agricultural subsidies (this is about 30 billion)
End trade barriers on agriculture (sugar and milk are the most well-known of these).
Basically just abolish the department of agriculture and leave the USDA's food safety system in place (and consolidate the USDA and FDA mandates and departments into one branch rather than spread all over like some grotesque word salad of rules)
Abolish the vice presidency and any duplicate functions of the executive branch associated with the bureaucracy for this position. I've already outlined my presumed method of replacement should the president be assassinated, killed, or die in office. Some method of chain of command would already be in place should the President be seriously ill for a period of time (say a stroke, cancer, etc).
Abolish department of Homeland Security. These functions were all properly maintained in pre-existing federal bureaucracies (FBI, CIA, NSA, etc). Privatize airport security as well.
Abolish DEA and DARE program and related drug enforcement positions.
Abolish or privatize the postal service.
Abolish department of Commerce, or at least its non-statistical/patent law functions (essentially all commercial subsidies). I guess we can keep the census, NOAA, BEA, NIST and patent office. ITA needs to go.
Abolish the department of Energy. Most of this money is subsidies on coal, oil, and maintenance of DoD nuclear activities (which can be done by the DoD). (about 40 billion total).
Abolish the department of Transportation. Retain or phase out gasoline taxes, but ideally implement more local/state toll taxes on congestion pricing for controlled access roads (ie, highways) instead. Privatizing air traffic control should have been done decades ago. (about 80 billion)
Curtail the department of labour's activities to those related to fair labour practices and the collection of labour statistics (such as employment). Why we need a faith-based and community initiative board funded at the federal level is beyond me already, but why it's seated in the DoL is even stranger.
Abolish HUD. Maintain some basic banking regulations on loans and mortgages and for home construction instead. Local-state governments should abolish rent controls while we're at it. If nothing else, kick out Fannie and Freddie immediately.
Abolish department of Education. Reform payment of schools to create a system of tax credits issued for education spending, payable to any institution of the taxpayers' choice. A similar concept for health insurance and retirement spending may be reasonable, though in all three cases, the government should not control where the money must go (other than that it should be spent on some enterprise related to the tax credit, education spending for the education tax credits, health spending for the health credit), and we should have something like actual health insurance as an option (that is: catastrophic health care coverage with a high deductible, possibly with guaranteed issue, but risk-adjusted premiums, just like any other form of insurance). May end up costing about the same in actual subsidies, but often at the state-local level instead of federal.
Presumably smaller cuts are there to be made to state and treasury, or at least reforms, though neither takes up a substantial part of the budget on its own.
Defence spending
Reduce our nuclear arsenal
Major cuts to defence spending and reform procurement and payment for military. I would suggest about half of the defence budget over a 10 year period be trimmed off. This would still put us at about 3 times the next highest country and the level of the entire EU. Much of current military bloating spending is related to the idea that more ground troops would be needed to fight wars and create occupations like those Iraq or Afghanistan. Such wars are a considerable waste of time and money and do not serve to increase national security. Therefore, the type of thinking necessary to fight such wars is flawed. At best we should retain a high-quality special operations force for such incursions, and move on to other national defence priorities than fighting peasants over rocks. Large portions of spending are also allocated to construction projects in these war-zones. While I do not object to foreign aid as such, I don't see its utility in an active war zone of an occupied country.
Devolve the VA into DoD funding. We don't need an additional special interest group with a seat at the table for veterans over and above active soldiers.
Entitlements.
Block grants for medicaid instead of matching grants.
Voucherized/means test Social security/medicare. Phased in so near-retirees don't freak out.
Alternatively, use a negative income tax and abolish (nearly) all forms of welfare and itemized deductions. This would end things like the home mortgage interest deduction, food stamps, unemployment insurance, social security, medicare, and so on. A downside risk is a few extra lazy people who don't produce anything for the economy. But personally, I'd rather such people not be working. They're not likely to be very productive employees anyway.
14 February 2011
Another confusion
I keep seeing right-leaning talking points on Egypt presuming that somehow this is comparable to Iran in either 1979, or 2009, and that somehow, someway, in both cases Democrats fucked it up (and it continues the right's healthy and persistent narrative that Carter/Obama are replaceable nouns). Not only does this tacitly ignore that somehow, someway, a Republican administration fucked up Iraq, in some measures far worse and far to the detriment of Iraqis, but it also implicitly suggests a course of action that Obama in particular should have taken vis a vis the Green revolution in 2009 and that there were somehow benefits that would have resulted in the Iranian regime.
So far as I can tell, the Iranian revolt was never very positively oriented around the removal of the Iranian regime of a theocratic constitution in the way that Egypt's protests have become about the Mubarak regime and its "emergency" powers (and not just about Mubarak at the head of it). Instead it was positively oriented around what was perceived as a fraudulent election. Despite this agenda, I don't see how this is the same as perceiving widespread changes to the overall structure of Iran's foreign policy, agenda on nuclear power/enrichment, or any other immediate gains that could be declared as obvious and sweeping resulting from a successful Green revolt taking power. Maybe a few social internal policies would moderate (though this also is doubtful given that the Iranian mullahs sign off on the choice of high officials open to elected offices), but you weren't getting a lot of change in the perceived hostile space between US and Iranian interests. But even if it were so that supporting such a change would have resulted in something, how would we have gone about this? Rhetorical support (beyond simply protesting the use of violence and suppression of free expression)? Funding for anti-regime forces? Military attack or sabotage on regime centers of support? In autocratic regimes, it is typical to blame outside influences and forces for the failures of internal policies. It's an old legend, and it's one that regimes can use to rally bases of support against perceived traitors in their own midst in a population accustomed to somewhat reporting on itself to authoritarian security forces. Iran was no different. And so we would propose to associate ourselves, clearly, philosophically, and financially with the people who were being called out as American agents already? As satisfying as it can be to root for freedom of millions of oppressed peoples, what we may yet learn out of Egypt is that these things can form organically, and do not necessarily require our influence and guidance to sustain themselves. And that baldly associating ourselves with one side or the other risks much, providing fuel for the oppressive leader should he remain in power (as well as alienating them if they were modestly pro-Western, as Mubarak has been), and often weakening the position of the eventual pro-democratic revolutionaries to a position perceived as illegitimate to former regime bases of support or other nationalist interests. It is enough to simply declare the "American" set of democratic values and demand that the people's grievances receive their airing and appropriate responses (and not tear gas and brutal arrest crackdowns). And then move on. Which is basically what Obama did in Iran, and Egypt. It is not often that I can look at our policies somewhere and say at least "well we didn't fuck ourselves too badly.", and I am inclined to give some modest kudos for doing so.
In the airing of this set of criticisms, there is left unexpressed what course of action would have been preferred to this. The people are invited to suggest their own internal preferences, perhaps a more pro-democratic promotion stance, or perhaps more militant responses, without clearly stating which stance is preferred by the critic, if the critic holds any such policy preferences at all (other than cynical political resistance to an opposition party). Maybe sometimes it is enough to see weakness in the position taken by one's leaders, but I prefer seeing someone have the guts to say what they might do differently in this situation before acceding that maybe they know of what they speak. I'm not sure what exactly it is that many critics think we had the power to do (both in 2009 and now), and whether or not they are aware of the consequences of their proposed actions or whether or not they are aware that we often did not even possess the powers they imply we should use instead. And this makes such criticism seem a little more ridiculous than it really is.
(After offering some faint praise for Obama here, I'm about to offer some significant "fuck off" for his pandering on the budget he just released. Give me back the Obama who speaks to us like adults and at least mentions entitlements, tax complexity, and defence spending in a budget. I'll probably outline my own idealistic cuts at the same time, so that may be a couple days... but just.. yeah. He really should have proposed something, even if Republicans in the House would have just reflexively opposed it and nothing would happen)
So far as I can tell, the Iranian revolt was never very positively oriented around the removal of the Iranian regime of a theocratic constitution in the way that Egypt's protests have become about the Mubarak regime and its "emergency" powers (and not just about Mubarak at the head of it). Instead it was positively oriented around what was perceived as a fraudulent election. Despite this agenda, I don't see how this is the same as perceiving widespread changes to the overall structure of Iran's foreign policy, agenda on nuclear power/enrichment, or any other immediate gains that could be declared as obvious and sweeping resulting from a successful Green revolt taking power. Maybe a few social internal policies would moderate (though this also is doubtful given that the Iranian mullahs sign off on the choice of high officials open to elected offices), but you weren't getting a lot of change in the perceived hostile space between US and Iranian interests. But even if it were so that supporting such a change would have resulted in something, how would we have gone about this? Rhetorical support (beyond simply protesting the use of violence and suppression of free expression)? Funding for anti-regime forces? Military attack or sabotage on regime centers of support? In autocratic regimes, it is typical to blame outside influences and forces for the failures of internal policies. It's an old legend, and it's one that regimes can use to rally bases of support against perceived traitors in their own midst in a population accustomed to somewhat reporting on itself to authoritarian security forces. Iran was no different. And so we would propose to associate ourselves, clearly, philosophically, and financially with the people who were being called out as American agents already? As satisfying as it can be to root for freedom of millions of oppressed peoples, what we may yet learn out of Egypt is that these things can form organically, and do not necessarily require our influence and guidance to sustain themselves. And that baldly associating ourselves with one side or the other risks much, providing fuel for the oppressive leader should he remain in power (as well as alienating them if they were modestly pro-Western, as Mubarak has been), and often weakening the position of the eventual pro-democratic revolutionaries to a position perceived as illegitimate to former regime bases of support or other nationalist interests. It is enough to simply declare the "American" set of democratic values and demand that the people's grievances receive their airing and appropriate responses (and not tear gas and brutal arrest crackdowns). And then move on. Which is basically what Obama did in Iran, and Egypt. It is not often that I can look at our policies somewhere and say at least "well we didn't fuck ourselves too badly.", and I am inclined to give some modest kudos for doing so.
In the airing of this set of criticisms, there is left unexpressed what course of action would have been preferred to this. The people are invited to suggest their own internal preferences, perhaps a more pro-democratic promotion stance, or perhaps more militant responses, without clearly stating which stance is preferred by the critic, if the critic holds any such policy preferences at all (other than cynical political resistance to an opposition party). Maybe sometimes it is enough to see weakness in the position taken by one's leaders, but I prefer seeing someone have the guts to say what they might do differently in this situation before acceding that maybe they know of what they speak. I'm not sure what exactly it is that many critics think we had the power to do (both in 2009 and now), and whether or not they are aware of the consequences of their proposed actions or whether or not they are aware that we often did not even possess the powers they imply we should use instead. And this makes such criticism seem a little more ridiculous than it really is.
(After offering some faint praise for Obama here, I'm about to offer some significant "fuck off" for his pandering on the budget he just released. Give me back the Obama who speaks to us like adults and at least mentions entitlements, tax complexity, and defence spending in a budget. I'll probably outline my own idealistic cuts at the same time, so that may be a couple days... but just.. yeah. He really should have proposed something, even if Republicans in the House would have just reflexively opposed it and nothing would happen)
File under hypocrisy
"I witnessed someone calling Ron Paul people a “cult” while eating a cake shaped like Reagan’s face."
At CPAC.
The Ron Paul contingent to the GOP/Tea Party does sometimes look this way to me as well.
But really, you're the people who belong to private religious associations which constrict idol worship then worship America and Ronald Reagan as idols, and you're calling the quasi-libertarian wing of the party a "cult"?
I'm having a hard time following the logic here as though this being a "cult" is supposed to be a bad thing. Or is it only okay when it's the cults you approve of?
At CPAC.
The Ron Paul contingent to the GOP/Tea Party does sometimes look this way to me as well.
But really, you're the people who belong to private religious associations which constrict idol worship then worship America and Ronald Reagan as idols, and you're calling the quasi-libertarian wing of the party a "cult"?
I'm having a hard time following the logic here as though this being a "cult" is supposed to be a bad thing. Or is it only okay when it's the cults you approve of?
Various points
If someone came forward with a political platform to attack at least 3 of these, without also proposing to strengthen the other 3, I'd vote for them.
1. The huge rise in occupational licensing.
2. The huge rise in people incarcerated in the war on drugs, and also the scandalous reluctance of doctors to prescribe adequate pain medication (also due to the war on drugs.)
3. The need for more legal immigration.
4. The need to replace taxes on capital with progressive consumption taxes.
5. Local zoning rules that prevent dense development.
6. Tax exemptions for mortgage interest and health insurance.
Also important: many of these are local or state issues. Occupational licensing laws differ by state, so do many drug laws (possession laws especially), taxation differs slightly by state (though very few states impose something like a VAT as opposed to capital taxation), and in fact zoning laws are almost entirely a state-local issue. This would mean that these issues could and should be attacked in a decentralised way. Yet because there's relative agreement between Democrats and Republicans over levers of control in these areas, we don't get many local politicians promising to overturn local zoning laws or license requirements for barbers, teachers, or dental assistants and so on.
I'd also second the categories. I very much consider myself a pragmatic libertarian, concerned with outcomes and harms imposed by bad political policies. Another phrase for it might be an economically educated liberal/progressive. That is: that I know "liberal" free market policies will tend to produce better outcomes than centralised controls or state laws will, but also that silly outdated traditional adherence on various cultural matters imposes substantial costs to society that could be properly outsourced by removing those state-controls (things like state-imposed discrimination against homosexuals in the same vein as Jim Crow laws, narcotics consumption, vice crimes, etc). I'd say there's a wide amount of academic perspectives that seems to share these sorts of views, and fair amount of idealised conservativism and progressivism as well, and obviously neither of these groups compose a large portion of the middle ground actually found in politics. What concerns libertarians (and those few idealistic polar opposites) is the prevalence of corrupted versions making up the middle who actually get to govern the country at any level. So we get "free market" Republicans who vote for tax subsidies for corn and oil and imposing restrictions on immigration and vice transactions, and putatively utilitarian Democrats voting to preserve teachers unions concerns and those of other much larger interest groups (as opposed to the general interests of the public), and so on.
This also captures that split on libertarian grounds between Hayekians and Rothbardians. I very recently had to explain the "taxation is theft" vision of libertarianism. I think there's a modest moral concern there regarding taxation, but it can be outweighed by a small, efficient state providing public goods and capturing externality costs. If instead we get a large, inefficient state providing large economic rents to favoured interests instead of public goods, then yes, by all means, object to the state's taxation on moral grounds.
Just make sure you also object to its spending (as many Tea Partiers do on principle, but not in actual practice).
1. The huge rise in occupational licensing.
2. The huge rise in people incarcerated in the war on drugs, and also the scandalous reluctance of doctors to prescribe adequate pain medication (also due to the war on drugs.)
3. The need for more legal immigration.
4. The need to replace taxes on capital with progressive consumption taxes.
5. Local zoning rules that prevent dense development.
6. Tax exemptions for mortgage interest and health insurance.
Also important: many of these are local or state issues. Occupational licensing laws differ by state, so do many drug laws (possession laws especially), taxation differs slightly by state (though very few states impose something like a VAT as opposed to capital taxation), and in fact zoning laws are almost entirely a state-local issue. This would mean that these issues could and should be attacked in a decentralised way. Yet because there's relative agreement between Democrats and Republicans over levers of control in these areas, we don't get many local politicians promising to overturn local zoning laws or license requirements for barbers, teachers, or dental assistants and so on.
I'd also second the categories. I very much consider myself a pragmatic libertarian, concerned with outcomes and harms imposed by bad political policies. Another phrase for it might be an economically educated liberal/progressive. That is: that I know "liberal" free market policies will tend to produce better outcomes than centralised controls or state laws will, but also that silly outdated traditional adherence on various cultural matters imposes substantial costs to society that could be properly outsourced by removing those state-controls (things like state-imposed discrimination against homosexuals in the same vein as Jim Crow laws, narcotics consumption, vice crimes, etc). I'd say there's a wide amount of academic perspectives that seems to share these sorts of views, and fair amount of idealised conservativism and progressivism as well, and obviously neither of these groups compose a large portion of the middle ground actually found in politics. What concerns libertarians (and those few idealistic polar opposites) is the prevalence of corrupted versions making up the middle who actually get to govern the country at any level. So we get "free market" Republicans who vote for tax subsidies for corn and oil and imposing restrictions on immigration and vice transactions, and putatively utilitarian Democrats voting to preserve teachers unions concerns and those of other much larger interest groups (as opposed to the general interests of the public), and so on.
This also captures that split on libertarian grounds between Hayekians and Rothbardians. I very recently had to explain the "taxation is theft" vision of libertarianism. I think there's a modest moral concern there regarding taxation, but it can be outweighed by a small, efficient state providing public goods and capturing externality costs. If instead we get a large, inefficient state providing large economic rents to favoured interests instead of public goods, then yes, by all means, object to the state's taxation on moral grounds.
Just make sure you also object to its spending (as many Tea Partiers do on principle, but not in actual practice).
11 February 2011
Egypt
Or otherwise, throwing some cold water.
I'm reasonably pleased to be wrong that Mubarak fell as quickly as he did. That said.
1) We don't yet know the shape of the next regime. It could be anything from a democratic reformation in the modern Turkish model (with some Islamic/Islamist influence), the Pakistani model under Musharaf with a strong military dominance on politics, the Palestinian model under Hamas, or an unstable series of counter-revolutions. The main reason for this appears to be that while there's a unified force behind removing Mubarak and his obvious cronies (Sulieman for instance), there wasn't a clear voice declaring what exactly came if he actually went.
2) Now that he is gone, it will probably be some months before a clear government emerges. Elections take a while to organise, oppositional political parties that haven't existed will be formed, constitutional reforms will probably be necessary, and so on. This means we won't have much of any idea what's going on for a while. For Egyptians, some celebration is warranted, it's not every day you kick out a 30 year dictator, even if the regime itself remains mostly intact. For Americans and other interested Westerners, this is sort of like celebrating on Opening Day as though you've just won the pennant.
3) I don't see how this influences positively (or negatively) the peace process in Palestine. Again, we do not yet know the scope and form of the change. I think what appears to be the democratic opinion of Egyptians is that peace with Israel is favorable and should remain, but that peace with Israel including cooperation to be suppressing Palestinians is not (ie, the blockade). To my mind, Israel probably lost what precious little moral credibility in the region it had to continue that blockade last year with its raid on the Turkish flotilla. It's unclear what effect that will actually have on the ability of the various parties to influence policy. But one possibility is the model of the more temperate Muslim Brotherhood on Hamas. Another would be that Egypt would become a hotbed of weapons smuggling into the Palestinian territories.
In reality, what appears to be THE stumbling block is Israel and Israeli intransigence. Based on the leaked Wiki cables relating to the subject, the Palestinian negotiators were basically caving left and right and Israel still basically told them to fuck off. If that's the case, then it will take a lot more than a few Egyptian smugglers running weapons (along with legal trade in food, medicine, and other trade goods) into Gaza to get them to change their tune. In other words, I don't see what difference this really makes. Maybe it will. But it's doubtful.
4) What does appear to be good news for Americans is that there's a less obvious extremist narrative about American hypocrisy propping up dictatorial and corrupt regimes in the region. There's still the Saudis, Yemen, to a lesser extent Jordan, and of course, there's Iraq.
But Egypt was the biggest card in the deck. If it can maneuver its way into becoming even a semi-democratic state, I suspect we're better off from a security standpoint.
I'm reasonably pleased to be wrong that Mubarak fell as quickly as he did. That said.
1) We don't yet know the shape of the next regime. It could be anything from a democratic reformation in the modern Turkish model (with some Islamic/Islamist influence), the Pakistani model under Musharaf with a strong military dominance on politics, the Palestinian model under Hamas, or an unstable series of counter-revolutions. The main reason for this appears to be that while there's a unified force behind removing Mubarak and his obvious cronies (Sulieman for instance), there wasn't a clear voice declaring what exactly came if he actually went.
2) Now that he is gone, it will probably be some months before a clear government emerges. Elections take a while to organise, oppositional political parties that haven't existed will be formed, constitutional reforms will probably be necessary, and so on. This means we won't have much of any idea what's going on for a while. For Egyptians, some celebration is warranted, it's not every day you kick out a 30 year dictator, even if the regime itself remains mostly intact. For Americans and other interested Westerners, this is sort of like celebrating on Opening Day as though you've just won the pennant.
3) I don't see how this influences positively (or negatively) the peace process in Palestine. Again, we do not yet know the scope and form of the change. I think what appears to be the democratic opinion of Egyptians is that peace with Israel is favorable and should remain, but that peace with Israel including cooperation to be suppressing Palestinians is not (ie, the blockade). To my mind, Israel probably lost what precious little moral credibility in the region it had to continue that blockade last year with its raid on the Turkish flotilla. It's unclear what effect that will actually have on the ability of the various parties to influence policy. But one possibility is the model of the more temperate Muslim Brotherhood on Hamas. Another would be that Egypt would become a hotbed of weapons smuggling into the Palestinian territories.
In reality, what appears to be THE stumbling block is Israel and Israeli intransigence. Based on the leaked Wiki cables relating to the subject, the Palestinian negotiators were basically caving left and right and Israel still basically told them to fuck off. If that's the case, then it will take a lot more than a few Egyptian smugglers running weapons (along with legal trade in food, medicine, and other trade goods) into Gaza to get them to change their tune. In other words, I don't see what difference this really makes. Maybe it will. But it's doubtful.
4) What does appear to be good news for Americans is that there's a less obvious extremist narrative about American hypocrisy propping up dictatorial and corrupt regimes in the region. There's still the Saudis, Yemen, to a lesser extent Jordan, and of course, there's Iraq.
But Egypt was the biggest card in the deck. If it can maneuver its way into becoming even a semi-democratic state, I suspect we're better off from a security standpoint.
10 February 2011
Random amusement
I think it would be awfully interesting if, after this Egypt rebellion is settled, and it appears now with the military involved to be settling into an effective rebellion, we'll have to see how it goes in terms of any reforms,
one starts in...
Iraq. Which now has larger domestic protests concerning economic hardships. And an autocratic unresponsive and corrupt regime.
one starts in...
Iraq. Which now has larger domestic protests concerning economic hardships. And an autocratic unresponsive and corrupt regime.
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